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Abstract  Truth pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between domains of discourse: while 
ordinary descriptive claims or those of the hard sciences might be true in virtue of corresponding to 
reality, those concerning ethics, mathematics, institutions (or modality, aesthetics, comedy…) might 
be true in some non-representational or “anti-realist” sense.  Despite pluralism attracting increasing 
amounts of attention, the motivations for the view remain underdeveloped.  This paper investigates 
whether pluralism is well-motivated on ontological grounds: that is, on the basis that different 
discourses are concerned with different kinds of entities.  Arguments that draw on six different 
ontological contrasts are examined: (i) concrete vs. abstract entities; (ii) mind-independent vs. mind-
dependent entities; (iii) sparse vs. merely abundant properties; (iv) objective vs. projected entities; (v) 
natural vs. non-natural entities; and (vi) ontological pluralism (entities that literally exist in different 
ways).  I argue that the additional premises needed to move from such contrasts to truth pluralism 
are either implausible or unmotivated, often doing little more than to bifurcate the nature of truth 
when a more theoretically conservative option is available.  If there is a compelling motivation for 
pluralism, I suggest, it’s likely to lie elsewhere. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Some facts are more suspicious than others.  Most of us are happy to concede that there is a 
world out there, existing independently of what we happen to think about it, and that when we’re 
talking about tables, chairs, cats, mountains, and perhaps electrons, quarks, and so forth, what we’re 
trying to do is describe that world.  But it’s hard to feel this way about everything we say.  For one 
reason or another, it can be hard to see how the ethical, the mathematical, or the institutional, as well 
as the modal, the psychological, the aesthetic, the comedic, and so on, is a part of that world.  And yet 
it’s often equally hard to believe that all such talk involves misapprehension – that it is an attempt to 
describe some aspect of the world that simply isn’t there. 
One way to try and split the difference is to appeal to a non-representational theory of truth 
in the problematic domains.  Suppose it is a mind-independently given fact that Felix, the cat, is furry 
and that Lexy, the electron, is negatively charged.  If so, then (1) and (2) might be true in virtue of 
accurately representing, or “corresponding to”, those facts: 
 
(1) Felix is furry. 
(2) Lexy is negatively charged. 
(3) 7 is prime. 
(4) Kicking puppies is wrong. 
(5) Prince William is married. 
 
But instead of appealing to a mathematical, ethical, or institutional fact to explain why (3), (4), 
or (5) is true, we might endorse some coherentist, pragmatist, or epistemic conception of truth.  
Perhaps (3), (4), and (5) are true in virtue of cohering with the relevant mathematical axioms, stable 
moral theory, or body of law.  Most prominent in this context is Crispin Wright’s (1992: 48) 
generalisation of the notion of a mathematical proof: superassertibility.  Roughly speaking, (3), (4), or 
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(5) is assertible iff there is some state of information that warrants believing or asserting it; it is 
superassertible iff this warrant would survive no matter how much that state of information was 
improved.1  The result is a kind of truth pluralism: what it is for something to be true varies between 
domains.2 
Many, including me, have found this picture intuitive enough to spend considerable time and 
energy trying to figure out how the theory is best formulated and how to respond to objections.  
Comparatively little, however, has been done to investigate the motivations for truth pluralism – to 
see if the foundations are secure, before trying to build elaborate structures and fend off attacks.3 
There is good reason to think that we need more than the intuitive rationale just given.  When 
it comes to vindicating our competing “realist” and “anti-realist” intuitions in different domains, there 
is no shortage of other contenders.  Moreover, if one’s motivation is merely suspicion about the 
relevant entities and facts, then it’s not obvious that truth pluralism alone gets you what you want.  If 
(3) is true at all, then by any plausible logic it follows that there is something that is prime (namely, 
the number 7).  To that extent, at least, there is a mathematical object.  Similarly, it follows that there 
is something that 7 is (namely, prime) – so to that extent there is a mathematical property.  And if 
there is a mathematical object that exemplifies a mathematical property then there is, in that sense, 
a mathematical fact.  So, while we may not have appealed to mathematical entities to explain why (3) 
is true, it’s not obvious that we’re off the hook just for that.4 
 
1 See Dorsey (2006), Lynch (2009: ch.8), and Gamester (2017: ch.5) for cognate suggestions. 
2 Throughout this paper, my focus is on “inflationary” pluralisms that endorse both representational and non-
representational truth properties, which is the locus of most of the philosophical attention pluralism has 
garnered thus far.  Rather than: “correspondence” pluralisms, which endorse only representational truth 
properties (e.g. Sher 1998); hybrid pluralisms, which endorse inflationary and deflationary truth properties 
(McGee 2005; Kölbel 2008; Ferrari & Moruzzi 2018); and deflationary pluralisms, which endorse only 
deflationary truth properties (Beall 2013).  Considering other kinds of pluralism would, unfortunately, 
complicate the dialectic substantially; nonetheless, other pluralists may well find help or hindrance within. 
3 Besides the work discussed below, only Pedersen (2014) and Ball (2017) have engaged seriously with the 
question of the underlying motivations for pluralism. 
4 One could try to defuse this worry by arguing that the existential quantifier receives a “deflationary” reading 
in such cases.  This does not affect the dialectical point I am making here, since to do so is to move beyond the 
kind of rough-and-ready, intuitive motivation with which we started, and instead draw on substantive, 
philosophically interesting contrasts between domains – just as I’m suggesting we should. 
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The most important demand for more motivation, however, comes from the fact that the 
pluralist’s place in the explanatory story makes for an uncomfortable stopping point.  That is, even if 
we grant that the nature of truth varies between domains, the obvious question is: Why?  Why is it 
that truth is a matter of corresponding to the facts in some domains, but is a matter of coherence or 
superassertibility in others?  What is it about mathematics, ethics, or the institutional, in contrast to, 
say, the hard sciences, that makes discourse concerning the former apt for one truth property, while 
the latter is apt for another?  Are we to take the difference as brute?  Explanation must stop 
somewhere, but stopping here would surely be unsatisfying. 
Two broad strategies present themselves.  The first is metaphysical or ontological.  It appeals 
to differences in the nature of the entities – objects, properties, or facts, say – that different discourses 
are concerned with; contrasting, say, the medium-sized dry goods of everyday life with abstract 
objects like numbers, prescriptive properties like wrongness, or mind-dependent properties like being 
married.  The second is functional or teleological.  It appeals to differences in what the relevant 
thought and talk is for; in particular, that while some discourses serve a representational function – 
meaning we use the very referring terms of the discourse to explain its existence – others serve a non-
representational function.5 
The strategies are by no means exclusive.6  Misgivings about the entities of some domain 
might motivate a non-representational explanation of the purpose of the discourse; a non-
representational explanation of the discourse might motivate a different conception of the relevant 
entities.  And different strategies might be better suited to different domains: the metaphysical 
approach to mathematics, and the teleological to ethics, say. 
 
5 The paradigm here is metaethical, or metanormative, expressivism: ‘although the teleology of spatial 
perception is spatial, the teleology of ethical commitment is not ethical.’ (Blackburn 1993: 169) 
6 Nor need they be exhaustive.  Perhaps further strategies could appeal to, say, epistemological or normative 
differences (perhaps including Wright’s (1992) cruces: evidence-transcendence, cognitive command, width of 
cosmological role, etc.).  However, I’m inclined to think that such differences between discourses will likewise 
demand explanation, and that the natural explanatory strategies are, once more, ontological or teleological.  If 
so, then while epistemological or normative differences may be an important part of an ontologically- or 
teleologically-driven strategy, ontology or teleology will be explanatorily fundamental. 
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Establishing that there are substantive metaphysical or teleological differences between 
domains – perhaps with accompanying epistemological or normative7 differences – is, I’ll assume, 
sufficient to render truth pluralism a salient theoretical option, a live possibility worth taking seriously.  
But presumably the pluralist thinks it does more than that.  The pluralist’s view is that such differences 
give us some reason to prefer truth pluralism to its theoretical competitors, and in particular to global 
versions of the theories the pluralist endorses only locally. 
This paper sets out to see whether this is so, focusing on the metaphysical strategy in 
particular.  This narrowing of focus has tactical motivation.  It is partly pragmatics: we can only cover 
so much in one paper, and this approach provides plenty to engage with.  But it is also rhetorical.  The 
metaphysical strategy has been more prominent in the literature,8 but I strongly suspect the pluralist 
is better served by the teleological strategy.  By detailing the challenges facing the former, I hope to 
refocus pluralists’ efforts. 
Any metaphysical motivation for truth pluralism will face a flat-footed challenge.  Granted, 
different discourses might be concerned with radically different kinds of entities.  But if we’re happy 
with the idea that truth at least sometimes consists in correspondence with the facts, then why not 
think that it always does so, and that what varies is simply the kinds of facts that different discourses 
correspond to?  If we can have variation in the entities or facts – in the “worldly” relatum of the 
correspondence relation – then why also think that we need variation in the nature of truth?  This 
kind of argument has sometimes been pressed as the “double-counting” or “Quine-Sainsbury” 
objection to pluralism.9 
I think the best way to view the metaphysical strategy is an attempt to meet this challenge by 
arguing that ontological variation of one kind or another motivates truth pluralism.  The arguments 
 
7 On normative differences in this context, see e.g. Ferrari (2019), Pedersen (2020). 
8 Though Lynch (2013, 2015, 2019) seems to be shifting towards the teleological strategy (see also Wright 
1998: 191).  Other exceptions are Ball (2017) and Gamester (2017). 
9 See Quine (1960: 118-119); Sainsbury (1996); Dodd (2013); Asay (2018); Bar-On & Simmons (2019).  Unlike 
some of these presentations, I’ve tried to meet pluralists more on their own terms.  (I do not, for instance, 
assume the adequacy of a deflationary conception of truth or truthmaker theory.)  Let me hereby cancel any 
implication that the teleological strategy doesn’t face an analogous challenge – see Blackburn (2013). 
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for pluralism we’ll consider below thus exhibit a common structure, with two core claims.  First, that 
there is an important kind of ontological variation between the entities of different discourses.  As 
we’ll see, these range from the familiar (some entities are mind-independent, others mind-
dependent; some are concrete, others abstract) to the highly contentious (the nature of existence 
varies between different entities).  Second, that – given certain auxiliary premises – truth pluralism 
follows: in particular, that truth should be understood representationally in discourses concerning 
entities of one kind, and non-representationally in discourses concerning entities of another.  While 
the plausibility of the first step is, of course, crucial to the overall pluralist programme, in the spirit of 
open-minded generosity we’ll mostly grant to the pluralist that there are substantive ontological 
differences, of one kind or another, between domains.  Our primary focus will thus be the second step: 
whether such differences give us any reason to prefer pluralism to its theoretical competitors. 
Objects and properties vary along countless dimensions, which means the scope for finding 
an ontologically-driven pluralism of this form is vast.  To focus things, we’ll draw on the pioneering 
work of Douglas Edwards (section 2) and Michael Lynch (section 3).10  As motivation for pluralism, 
we’ll consider that certain entities: (i) literally exist in a different way; (ii) are projected; (iii) are merely 
abundant; (iv) are mind-dependent; (v) are non-natural; and (vi) are abstract.  (i)-(iii) are the focus of 
section 2.  We consider them as grounds for Edwards’s claim that what is so is sometimes grounded 
in what is true, and thus that truth is sometimes non-representational.  (iii)-(vi) are discussed in section 
3.  There, we consider Lynch’s argument that (a) representational or correspondence theories of truth 
should be cashed out in causal-representational terms, (b) causal representationalism does not apply 
in certain discourses, and therefore (c) that truth should be understood non-representationally in such 
discourses.  We consider (iii)-(vi) as grounds for (b). 
 
10 Nikolaj Pedersen also suggests that truth pluralism should be partly founded in a kind of “metaphysical 
pluralism” – see especially Pedersen (2014).  However, since his goal is only to show the latter ‘fits well’ with 
the former, rather than to provide anything like an argument (2014: 271), I have not found it productive to 
engage directly with Pedersen’s suggestive work here. 
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We hereby survey a wide variety of ontologically-driven arguments for pluralism.  None, I’ll 
argue, is compelling.  Even when the ontological variation in question is highly contentious, the 
auxiliary premises needed to move from such a claim to truth pluralism are either implausible or 
unattractive – sometimes only serving to bifurcate the nature of truth when there is, by the pluralist’s 
own lights, a more theoretically conservative option available.  We thereby vindicate the “double-
counting” worry that the metaphysical strategy renders truth pluralism something of a theoretical 
spinning-wheel (while leaving open that the theory may find more compelling motivation elsewhere). 
 
2. Being Grounded in Truth? 
 
Consider the T-schema: 
 
(T) ‘p’ is true iff p. 
 
One way of trying to argue for truth pluralism on ontological grounds is to argue that, due to 
the nature of the relevant entities, while certain instances of (T) need to be read with a left-to-right 
order of explanatory dependence (e.g. ‘iron is magnetic’ is true because iron is magnetic), other 
instances need to read with a right-to-left order of explanatory dependence (e.g. motorbikes are cool 
because ‘motorbikes are cool’ is true).  In the former cases, what is true depends on what is so, and 
thus – the reasoning goes – we ought to endorse a representational conception of truth.  However, in 
the latter cases, what is so depends on what is true; so our account of what it is for such sentences to 
be true cannot be representational, on pain of circularity.  If we’re to give a substantive account of 
what it is for such sentences to be true, then, truth must be understood non-representationally. 
This is the strategy that has been developed, in a couple of different ways, by Douglas 
Edwards.  As we’ll see, the crucial element of this argumentative structure is in arguing for the right-
to-left explanatory reading of certain instances of (T).  Edwards is hereby taking up an anti-realist 
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tradition, which maintains that, in certain domains, what is so depends in an important sense on what 
we say or think is so (or on our social practices more broadly); that the distinctions we’re drawing are 
not an antecedently given part of the mind-independent world, but instead created by us. 
Nonetheless, this strategy runs into a recurrent difficulty.  The problem is that the peculiarly 
alethic part of this explanatory story – which says that what is so depends on the truth of certain 
sentences (propositions, beliefs) – looks redundant.  It is quite possible to think that the coolness of 
motorbikes (say) depends on us and our social practices without thinking that it depends specifically 
on the truth of the sentence ‘motorbikes are cool’.  Indeed, I’ll argue that any such explanatory story 
that incorporates an alethic element has a more economical counterpart that does not.  But without 
the alethic element of the story, the argument for truth pluralism cannot get up and running: we can 
endorse the left-to-right explanatory reading of the T-schema across the board.  Truth pluralism thus 
becomes a theoretical spinning-wheel. 
That’s the general dialectic that we’ll see play out below.  Now for details. 
 
2.1 On ontological pluralism 
 
Let’s start with an argument developed jointly by Edwards and Aaron Cotnoir (Cotnoir & 
Edwards 2015).  The ontological variation Cotnoir & Edwards (2015: 119-120) discuss is the most 
radical variety going: a kind of ontological pluralism which says that the very nature of existence varies 
between different entities.  In particular, for concrete entities like tennis balls or the Eiffel Tower, it is 
captured by what they call “Alexander’s Dictum” (AD), while for abstract entities like numbers, it is 
captured by the “Neo-Fregean Principle” (NFP): 
 
 (AD)  To exist is to have causal powers. 
(NFP) To exist is to be the referent of a singular term that appears in a true sentence. 
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Granting ontological pluralism, one can readily get a sense of how the argument for truth 
pluralism is going to go.  The basic idea is that what is true is sometimes grounded in what exists – i.e., 
when the relevant entities exist in the sense of (AD) – but what exists is sometimes grounded in what 
is true – i.e., when the relevant entities exist in the sense of (NFP).  Truth is thus sometimes 
representational (in the former cases), and sometimes non-representational (in the latter cases).  I’ll 
run through this in more detail in a moment. 
However, Cotnoir & Edwards in fact formulate their argument in a curious way.  Calling the 
kind of existence captured by (AD), BEING1, and the kind of existence captured by (NFP), BEING2, their 
argument for truth pluralism (2015: 128, lightly edited) relies on the idea that these two kinds of 
existence are equi-fundamental: 
 
(I) BEING1 and BEING2 are equi-fundamental. Premise 
(II) BEING1 grounds TRUTHi. Premise 
(III) TRUTHj grounds BEING2. Premise 
(IV) TRUTHi = TRUTHj. Assumption for reductio 
(V) BEING1 grounds BEING2. From (II), (III), (IV), transitivity 
of grounding 
(VI) If x grounds y, then x is more fundamental than y. Definition of ‘grounding’ 
(VII) BEING1 is more fundamental than BEING2. From (V), (VI) 
(VIII) Contradiction. From (I), (VII) 
(IX) TRUTHi ≠ TRUTHj. Reductio from (I)-(VIII) 
 
The rationale for premise (III) is just (NFP): what exists is sometimes grounded in what is true.  
Assumption (IV) is truth monism: the view that the nature of truth is uniform.  The rationale for 
premise (II) takes some reconstruction.  Recall (1): 
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(1) Felix is furry. 
 
If things like cats exist in the sense of (AD), then Felix’s existence presumably does not depend 
on the truth of (1).  It’s thus natural to think that (1) is true at least in part because Felix exists – truth 
comes after existence in the explanatory order of things.  If that’s right, then the truth of (1) is 
grounded in BEING1, as premise (II) states.  Granting that, and given the equi-fundamentality premise 
(I), it’s easy to see how the truth monist is led into contradiction. 
The argument is neat, but unfortunately including premise (I) renders the overall picture here 
unstable.  We’re left with a straightforward dilemma.  (NFP) accounts for the existence of certain 
entities in terms of certain true sentences.  If these sentences are to be true, then they must exist.  But 
what kind of existence do they have?  If BEING2, then we’re off on a vicious regress.  If, however, the 
regress stops because some relevant sentence has BEING1, then BEING2 is grounded in BEING1 after 
all, violating (I).11 
Fortunately, it seems that the equi-fundamentality premise is not only problematic but 
unnecessary, as far as the argument for truth pluralism is concerned.  Suppose that the above 
reasoning for premise (II) is correct, so the truth of (1) is grounded in the existence of Felix, as per 
(let’s grant) a representational conception of truth.  Now recall (3): 
 
(3) 7 is prime. 
 
If things like numbers exist in the sense of (NFP), then 7’s existence is grounded in its being 
the referent of a singular term in a true sentence.  The theory does not tell us which true sentence(s), 
 
11 The dilemma does not appeal to any peculiar features of sentences qua truthbearers, so would presumably 
recur if we subbed in propositions or whatever else instead.  At this, but only this, point in the paper, the 
authors seem to take (I) to be essential to ontological pluralism, in which case the dilemma threatens 
refutation.  But it seems dispensable. 
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but suppose for the sake of argument that it’s (3) (or that (3) is among them).12  We thus cannot explain 
the truth of (3) by appealing to the number 7 and what it is like, on pain of circularity.  Therefore, in 
this instance truth arguably cannot consist in accurate representation of an antecedently given reality.  
So – the pluralist reasons – it must consist in something else, something non-representational.  It is 
consistent with this argument that (3) itself has BEING1, and thus that all BEING2 is ultimately grounded 
in BEING1.  (Or so it seems, and I’m willing to grant for the sake of argument.) 
There is, however, a deeper worry than any concerning the details of the argument itself.  
Recall that, for the ontological pluralist, (NFP) only tells us what existence consists in for certain 
entities – just to have a name, call them the constructed entities.  On pain of circularity, it follows that 
truth cannot be representational for those sentences whose truth grounds the existence of a 
constructed entity.  (That’s the argument for truth pluralism.)  So, for such sentences, let’s suppose 
that truth consists in some non-representational property, like superassertibility.  It must follow that, 
for any constructed entity x, x exists iff x is the referent of a singular term that appears in a sentence 
that is superassertible.  But now we face a challenge.  For given that we are committed to the truth of 
this biconditional, why not go in for (NFP*) instead of (NFP) as our account of what it is for a 
constructed entity to exist?: 
 
(NFP*) To exist is to be the referent of a singular term that appears in a 
superassertible sentence. 
 
If we endorse (NFP*) instead of (NFP), then while the existence of the number 7 still depends 
on (3) being superassertible, the truth of (3) can in turn depend on the existence of the number 7.  
Thus, even while the nature of existence varies, what is true can be uniformly grounded in what exists.  
Truth can thus be representational across the board. 
 
12 It’s interesting that, if the argument worked, strictly it would only show that some mathematical sentences 
are true in a non-representational sense. 
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The question, then, is what could motivate (NFP) over its rival.  The underlying ontological 
pluralism remains just as radical.  The principal difference is just that (NFP) engenders a bifurcation in 
the nature of truth where (NFP*) does not.  Theoretical economy demands the simpler option. 
One possible objection to (NFP*) is that other sentences, like those concerning the furriness 
of cats, can be superassertible (or whatever) without the relevant entities existing.  But both sides 
agree that superassertibility is sometimes sufficient for existence (numbers), but sometimes not (cats).  
That, we’re supposing, is a consequence of the ontological pluralism.  The difference is just that the 
advocate of (NFP) maintains that it is only when truth reduces to superassertibility that the latter is 
sufficient for existence, while the advocate of (NFP*) maintains that this gets the order of explanation 
the wrong way around: it is because superassertibility is only sufficient for existence in some cases 
that in those cases the sentences wind up being true.  Again, the upshot of doing things this way is 
that truth remains uniform, to (NFP*)’s credit.  Nor will it help to say that the truth of (3) entails 7’s 
existence, whereas its superassertibility does not.  The game is metaphysics, and as a matter of 
metaphysical necessity, both sides think (3) being superassertible is sufficient for 7’s existence.  As a 
matter of conceptual necessity (or similar), the observation isn’t pertinent. 
So, even granting that the patched version of Cotnoir & Edwards’s argument works, truth 
pluralism comes across as a spinning wheel in the ontological pluralist’s theoretical machinery, as 
predicted.  Now, perhaps we could go back-and-forth on (NFP) and (NFP*) some more (though I’ve 
been unable to conjure up anything convincing on (NFP)’s behalf myself).  At this point, however, I 
think we’re better served by looking for less controversial starting points. 
 
2.2 Edwards’s “strong” argument 
 
2.2.1 On objective and projected properties 
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To provide an ontological foundation for truth pluralism, one need not go so far as to say that 
the very nature of existence varies.  Less controversial is the idea that entities, which may all exist in 
the same way, come in importantly different varieties: while some are concrete, others are abstract; 
while some are mind-independent, others are mind-dependent.  It is to such premises we now turn. 
In his recent book, Edwards (2018) provides a “strong” argument for truth pluralism on the 
grounds that there are importantly different kinds of properties.13  Focusing on (utterances of) 
sentences of the form ‘a is F’, and assuming that predicates like ‘is F’ refer to properties like Fness, 
Edwards (67) says that we can distinguish three options vis-à-vis the property referred to by any 
particular predicate: (a) it is objective; (b) it is projected; or (c) there isn’t one.  (c) is an error-theoretical 
option that we’ll set aside. 
What is it for a property to be objective or projected?  Edwards (68) explicates the difference 
via the biconditional (P): 
 
(P) The object referred to by ‘a’ falls under the predicate ‘F’ iff the object referred to by 
‘a’ has the property referred to by ‘F’. 
 
A property, Fness, is objective iff there is a left-to-right order of explanatory dependence on 
(P): if a falls under the predicate ‘is F’, then it does so because it has the property of Fness.  Fness is 
projected iff there is the opposite direction of explanatory dependence: a has the property of Fness, 
if it does, because it falls under the predicate ‘F’.  So the property of being magnetic is objective iff 
things fall under the predicate ‘is magnetic’ because they are magnetic; it is projected iff things are 
magnetic because they fall under the predicate ‘is magnetic’. 
By this criterion, magnetism is objective: something’s being magnetic does not depend on us 
or which predicates we have.  A property’s being objective is hereby supposed to capture a kind of 
realism.  Edwards’s conception of projected properties, by contrast, taps into the anti-realist tradition 
 
13 All citations in this section to Edwards (2018), unless otherwise noted. 
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mentioned above: that, at least sometimes, when we carve up the world, the categories we use do 
not latch onto distinctions that are already out there – limning nature at its joints – but instead create 
those distinctions. 
Edwards goes on to argue that truth is representational when the sentence in question 
concerns an objective property; non-representational when it concerns a projected property.  We’ll 
consider the argument below (2.2.3).  First, however, it’s important to consider the ontological 
distinction that constitutes the basis of the argument (2.2.1 and 2.2.2). 
It is, as noted, highly plausible that there are objective properties.  The reason that iron falls 
under the predicate ‘is magnetic’ is because iron is magnetic.  Of course, this isn’t a complete 
explanation: we also need a metasemantic explanation of why ‘is magnetic’ refers to that property.  
After all, if we had used language differently, ‘is magnetic’ might have referred to the property of 
being invisible, and then iron would not fall under ‘is magnetic’, though it will still be magnetic.  
However, I’ve found it much more difficult to find a plausible example of a projected property in 
Edwards’s sense.  This matters, since in Edwards’s own taxonomy any property that is not projected 
is objective; and so, by his own argument, truth for the relevant sentences is representational.  Unless 
we have reason to think that some property is projected, Edwards’s argument for truth pluralism 
cannot get going. 
A property, Fness, is projected iff any object a that is F is F because it falls under the predicate 
‘is F’.  The most plausible contender, I think, is the “self-referential” property: falling under this 
predicate.  If any object falls under this predicate, then trivially it does so because it falls under this 
predicate; i.e., because it falls under ‘falls under this predicate’.  But I doubt that there are any such 
objects, and thus no true instance of ‘x falls under this predicate’. 
But what other property might be like this?  Edwards’s (68) example is being cool: 
 
‘One example here is the property of being cool: motorbikes have the property of being cool 
because motorbikes fall under the predicate ‘is cool’; rather than vice versa.’ 
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But this, I submit, is simply false.  If motorbikes are cool, then what makes them cool is 
presumably the way they look, the sound they make, the freedom they give you, the associated 
clothing, the kind of person who rides them, that sort of thing.  While I’m hardly an expert on the 
matter, I’m reasonably certain that falling within the extension of a predicate – even the predicate ‘is 
cool’ – is not the kind of thing that makes something cool.14  Similar objections apply to Edwards’s 
other purportedly projected properties, which are primarily properties that are plausibly socially 
constructed; e.g. being the Governor of New York or being a woman (72-73).15 
Now, one might concede the general point while still suggesting that falling under ‘is cool’ is 
part of what makes motorbikes cool.  But why think this?  For one thing, that there are other things 
that make motorbikes cool is necessary (motorbikes could hardly be cool simply in virtue of falling 
under the predicate); and once they are in place the other factors are sufficient (if they weren’t, then 
falling under the predicate could hardly tip the balance).  There’s no explanatory work for falling under 
the predicate to do here.  Alternatively, one might argue that the kinds of thing that explain why 
motorbikes are cool do so by explaining why they fall under the predicate ‘is cool’ (perhaps because 
they explain why ‘motorbikes are cool’ is true), which in turn explains why they are cool.  This looks 
coherent, but it’s difficult to see what independent motivation it has.  The additional cogs in the 
theoretical machinery are redundant. 
It's worth stressing that what I am querying here is Edwards’s particular conception of 
projection – the one on which his argument for truth pluralism rests – which explains property 
exemplification in terms of predicate satisfaction.  Nonetheless, an anonymous referee worries that I 
am begging the question against ‘broadly response-dependent (or other forms of non-realist 
 
14 The fact that motorbikes fall within the extension of ‘is cool’ is pretty cool, simply because the phenomenon 
of linguistic representation is pretty cool.  But that isn’t what makes motorbikes themselves cool.  
15 According to Edwards (67-69), moral expressivists that are happy to say that there are moral properties, like 
Blackburn (1993: 181) and Gibbard (2006), are committed to such properties being projected.  On the 
contrary, expressivists are typically at pains to argue that expressivism doesn’t entail that morality is mind-
dependent (let alone language-dependent). 
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metaphysics)’ of properties like coolness, according to which what is cool depends, in some sense, on 
what we judge or say is cool, or on our social practices more broadly.  This is a concern worth taking 
seriously.  One may suspect that there could be some anti-realist metaphysics of properties like 
coolness that entails that they are projected in Edwards’s sense; and thus, even if we’re not convinced 
by Edwards’s example, projection may stand on firmer ground than it appears here.  On the contrary, 
however, it is quite possible to subscribe to an anti-realist metaphysics of Fness without thinking that 
Fness is projected; indeed, there is good reason to think that any anti-realist metaphysics of Fness that 
does entail that Fness is projected ought to be replaced by another, closely-related, metaphysics that 
does not.  Let me explain. 
Suppose that Fness is projected, so any object that is F is so because it falls under ‘F’.  Now, 
let ‘φ’ abbreviate whatever conditions need to be satisfied to fully explain why some object a falls 
under ‘F’.  Since Fness is ex hypothesi projected, we know that φ does not mention that a is F.  We 
also know that it does not mention that a falls under ‘F’, on pain of circularity.  But beyond that, φ can 
build in pretty much whatever conditions you like.  That is, it may well be that what falls under ‘F’ 
depends, in some sense, on what we judge or say is F, or on our social practices more broadly.  It can, 
for instance, include that certain subjects would have certain responses to a in certain circumstances.  
To make the point explicit: we can build into φ whatever anti-realist story about properties like 
coolness one prefers. 
Now, if a falls under ‘F’, then (by disquotation) a is F.  And if φ holds then a falls under ‘F’.  
Therefore, if φ holds, then a is F; that is, φ is sufficient for a’s being F.  However, since φ does not 
mention that a falls under ‘F’, and Fness is projected, it follows that φ is not explanatorily sufficient 
for a’s being F.  We’re thus led to the view that, despite φ’s being sufficient for a’s being F, we have 
to add the fact that a falls under ‘F’ to φ – call this, φ+ – before we can fully explain why a is F. 
But now, I hope it is clear, there is a straightforward challenge: given that φ is sufficient for 
a’s being F, why take φ+ to be adequate to the explanatory task when φ is not?  The claim that Fness 
is projected seems to introduce an extra explanatory step where none is needed.  The simpler theory 
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is the one that says that φ is explanatorily sufficient for a’s being F.  And note that this is especially so 
if Edwards is right that the property’s being projected would entail that truth in the relevant discourse 
must be non-representational (see 2.2.3), for then adding in this (seemingly redundant) explanatory 
step would also engender a bifurcation in the nature of truth.  The critical point is that falling back on 
φ, rather than φ+, is perfectly compatible with φ giving us a response-dependent, or otherwise anti-
realist, metaphysics of Fness.  But unless there are projected properties in Edwards’s sense, the 
argument for truth pluralism cannot get up and running. 
 
2.2.2 From abundance to projection? 
 
Despite its central place in his argument for pluralism, Edwards gives little defence of 
projected properties per se, because he thinks the distinction between objective and projected 
properties ‘broadly correspond[s] to the distinction between sparse and abundant properties’ (68).  
This is striking.  Unlike Edwards’s rather idiosyncratic, linguistically-mediated conception of projection, 
the distinction between sparse and merely abundant properties is reasonably well-entrenched in 
contemporary metaphysics.  If Edwards is right that these distinctions align, and can thereby root his 
argument for truth pluralism in this less controversial ontological distinction, truth pluralism will stand 
on much firmer ground.  In open-minded spirit, then, it’s worth considering Edwards’s reasons for 
endorsing this alignment. 
First, then: what is the distinction?  On an abundant conception of properties, any (consistent) 
predicate whatsoever refers to a property, no matter how gerrymandered those entities in its 
extension.  If we define the predicate ‘is quurkey’ as: for any x, x is quurkey iff (x is a quark or x is a 
turkey), then ‘is quurkey’ refers to a property (quurkeyness); despite the fact that, intuitively at least, 
there is nothing substantive and interesting that just the quarks and turkeys have in common.  On a 
sparse conception of properties, by contrast, properties ground genuine similarities between entities 
and are of causal-explanatory significance.  Being a quark is a property, as is being a turkey; but 
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quurkeyness, no.  One problem with a sparse conception of properties, for Edwards, is that we must 
deny that some predicates refer to properties, which leaves them in need of a semantic value.  But on 
an abundant conception of properties, we cannot make sense of the difference between a causal-
explanatorily significant property like being a quark and a gerrymandered property like being quurkey.  
Thus Edwards (35), taking his lead from David Lewis (1983), endorses a pluralistic approach.  Any 
predicate refers to a property, but a proper subset of such properties is privileged, grounding genuine 
similarity relations, and so on.  The latter are the “sparse” properties, while the rest are “merely 
abundant”. 
It’s certainly not apparent at first sight that this distinction does, in fact, “broadly correspond” 
to Edwards’s own distinction between objective and projected properties.  If Gobbles is quurkey, then 
the complete explanation of why he is so is that he is a turkey (or that he is a quark, if he is a quark).  
There’s no explanatory role for falling under ‘quurkey’ to play here.  So why think that merely 
abundant properties are projected? 
We’ve thus far said nothing about what sparse and abundant properties are, except that 
sparse properties ground genuine similarities and are causal-explanatorily significant, while abundant 
properties do/are not.  Edwards (37) is neutral on whether sparse properties are best understood as 
universals, tropes, or natural classes.  But when it comes to abundant properties, he foregrounds 
“predicate nominalism” (34-35): 
 
‘On this view, there are properties insofar as there are extensions of predicates: to have the 
property of being red is to be in the extension of ‘red’ […]  On this view of properties, it is not 
the case that an object is in the extension of ‘is F’ because it has the property of being F; rather 
the object has the property of being F because it falls under the predicate ‘is F’.’ 
 
According to predicate nominalists, all and only the properties in existence are those that are 
referred to by our predicates.  And it certainly seems that, to avoid this being a massive and ever-
Page 19 of 41 
 
Shopping for Truth Pluralism – Final draft  Will Gamester 
evolving coincidence where properties conveniently pop in and out of existence as which predicates 
we have changes over time, we may well be tempted by the projective reading of (P) – an object a is 
F because it falls under the predicate ‘is F’ – as Edwards suggests (the considerations at the end of 
2.2.1 notwithstanding).  So, if we endorse predicate nominalism as a theory of abundant properties, 
then it looks like merely abundant properties are, in fact, projected. 
This is an intriguing move.  While this is not the place to settle the metaphysics of properties,16 
we ought to make the following three observations.  First, I’ve tried to motivate Edwards’s move from 
predicate nominalism to projection by pointing out that the perfect alignment the predicate 
nominalist postulates between which properties there are and which predicates we have threatens to 
be incredible unless we endorse the right-to-left explanatory reading of the biconditional (P).  
However, some predicate nominalists might reject this move by denying that there is anything to 
explain.  If to exemplify a property F just is to fall within the extension of the predicate ‘F’, then 
arguably the relevant instances of the biconditional are trivial: to say that a exemplifies the property 
of Fness just is to say that a falls within the extension of ‘F’.17  Second, note that the paradigm instances 
of merely abundant properties are gerrymandered properties like quurkeyness.  It is at least unusual 
to think that all the properties we talk about in a particular domain – like mathematical properties, 
ethical properties, or socially constructed properties – are all like this.  Is the pluralist committed to 
thinking that moral goodness is like quurkeyness, grouping together a hodgepodge of things that share 
no genuine similarity?  (Edwards, in fact, has his own reasons for drawing such an alignment – see 
fn.25.)  If not, then in rooting projection – and hence truth pluralism – in merely abundant properties, 
Edwards may fail to vindicate the intuitions that draw many to the view in the first place. 
 
16 Predicate nominalism faces serious worries (e.g., Armstrong 1978: ch.2; Edwards 2014: ch.5.2) but (i) so do 
other theories of properties; and (ii) these are normally levelled against predicate nominalism as a monistic 
theory of properties, rather than as part of a pluralistic theory.  So I won’t bother running through 
independent objections here. 
17 Of course, if trivial then the relevant instances of (P) are incompatible with an objective reading too.  So on 
this approach Edwards’s taxonomy of properties threatens to be non-exhaustive. 
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Third, when it comes to the metaphysics of abundant properties, predicate nominalism is not 
the only game in town (as Edwards notes in a footnote to the passage quoted above).  The class 
nominalist, for instance, maintains that any class of entities share a property: abundant properties are 
classes.  An object can be a member of the class of quarks and turkeys without our having a predicate 
ascribing the property; as, indeed, all turkeys and quarks were until quite recently.  In which case, the 
alignment between abundance and projection breaks down. 
Now, while at various points Edwards seems to have predicate nominalism in particular in 
mind, he talks in general (e.g., 86) as though any conception of abundant properties will entail that 
they are projected.  Indeed, in a striking footnote when he introduces the objective/projected 
distinction, Edwards (68) suggests that abundant properties are projected even if: 
 
‘we are thinking about properties as classes, and classes as mind-independent.  This is 
because, even if there is a vast number of classes, we still need to make sense of a predicate 
selecting a particular class, and thus having the particular extension it does, which will be 
dependent on our practices.’ 
 
But the reasoning here is difficult to follow.  As mentioned above, when it comes to predicates 
and properties, one salient class of questions is metasemantic: we can ask of any particular predicate 
why it refers to the property it does (‘magnetic’ to being magnetic; ‘quurkey’ to quurkeyness).  If this 
is what Edwards means by ‘mak[ing] sense of a predicate selecting a particular class’, then he is correct 
that the answer to this question will mention our practices.  But this must be kept separate from the 
question of why an object exemplifies that property: why iron is magnetic, or Gobbles is quurkey.  That 
we explain the meaning of ‘quurkey’ in terms of our practices does not make Gobbles’s being quurkey 
dependent on our practices, any more than our doing so for ‘magnetic’ makes iron’s being magnetic 
dependent on us.  The answers might be connected – for instance, if predicate nominalism is true – 
but we cannot presuppose this. 
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In sum, then: Edwards’s grounds for endorsing projected properties comes from a certain, 
highly controversial, metaphysics of abundant properties: predicate nominalism.  In the spirit of 
generosity, let’s grant this. 
 
2.2.3 The argument 
 
Having found grounds of at least some kind for Edwards’s distinction between objective and 
projected properties, we can turn – finally – to the ensuing argument for truth pluralism. 
For the sake of illustration, let’s suppose: (i) that being magnetic is an objective property and 
that a bit of iron – call it ‘Irene’ – exemplifies this property; and (ii) that being cool is a projected 
property and that a motorbike – call it ‘Jeff’ – exemplifies this property.  The argument to truth 
pluralism is then as follows (84-88).  Suppose all instances of the following schematic biconditionals 
are true: 
 
(FT) The object referred to by ‘a’ falls under the predicate ‘F’ iff ‘F’ is true of the object 
referred to by ‘a’. 
 (TO) ‘F’ is true of the object referred to by ‘a’ iff ‘a is F’ is true. 
 (TP) ‘a is F’ is true iff the object referred to by ‘a’ has the property referred to by ‘F’. 
  
Irene has the property referred to by ‘is magnetic’.  Since being magnetic is objective, by (P) 
this explains why Irene falls under the predicate ‘is magnetic’.  Given (FT), this in turn explains why ‘is 
magnetic’ is true of Irene; and given (TO), this explains why ‘Irene is magnetic’ is true.  Assuming the 
transitivity of explanation, ‘Irene is magnetic’ is thus true because the object referred to by ‘Irene’ has 
the property referred to by ‘is magnetic’.  This is an instance of (TP), with explanatory dependence 
from left-to-right: 
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(TPi) ‘Irene is magnetic’ is true because the object referred to by ‘Irene’ has the property 
referred to by ‘is magnetic’. 
 
By contrast, Jeff has the property referred to by ‘is cool’.  Since being cool is projected, by (P) 
this must be because Jeff falls under the predicate ‘is cool’.  This leaves us with the question of why 
Jeff falls under the predicate ‘is cool’.  Given (FT), Edwards suggests we appeal to ‘is cool’ being true 
of Jeff; in turn, given (TO), Edwards suggests that ‘is cool’ is true of Jeff because ‘Jeff is cool’ is true.  
Given the transitivity of explanation, we can thus say that the object referred to by ‘Jeff’ has the 
property referred to by ‘is cool’ because ‘Jeff is cool’ is true.  This is another instance of (TP), but this 
time with the explanatory dependence from right-to-left: 
 
(TPii) The object referred to by ‘Jeff’ has the property referred to by ‘is cool’ because ‘Jeff 
is cool’ is true. 
 
We can therefore read a different order of explanatory dependence into (TP) when the 
property is objective (left-to-right) and when it is projected (right-to-left).  So, what is true is 
sometimes grounded in what is so, and what is so is sometimes grounded in what is true.  In particular, 
the truth of ‘a is F’ depends on how things stand with a and Fness when Fness is objective, suggesting 
a representational conception of truth.  By contrast, how things stand with a and Fness depends on 
whether or not ‘a is F’ is true when Fness is projected, suggesting a non-representational conception 
of truth.  Thus, if some objects are objective and others are projected, then truth is sometimes 
representational, and sometimes non-representational. 
Clearly the crucial move in this argument is from the claim that Jeff is cool because he falls 
under the predicate ‘is cool’, to his being cool because ‘Jeff is cool’ is true, via (FT) and (TO).  Edwards 
(86) goes so far as to suggest that the idea that truth ‘is dependent on predicate satisfaction, is 
compatible only with the [objective] conception of properties… and not with the [projected] one.’  This 
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is, at best, hasty.  Granted, by definition we cannot explain why Jeff falls under ‘is cool’ in terms of 
Jeff’s being cool, since we’re assuming coolness is projected.  But for all that’s been said there may be 
some other explanation (as Edwards (88) seems to concede in a footnote).  This becomes pressing 
when we consider the limitations of Edwards’s proposal.  For instance, Edwards requires that we have 
a singular term for every entity x in the extension of ‘is cool’, otherwise there is no relevant sentence 
of the form ‘x is cool’ to be true.  This looks implausible, but it’s not obvious how we’re to avoid the 
difficulty without taking on new, substantive assumptions about truthbearers.  For instance, we might 
shift from sentences to propositions, conceived of as structured entities composed of necessarily 
existent abstract objects like Fregean senses.  We need details – such a move is non-trivial.  However, 
I raise this worry only to set it aside. 
The central difficulty for this line of argument is that Edwards faces an analogous challenge to 
the one we raised for Cotnoir & Edwards above.  By his own lights, the truth of ‘Jeff is cool’ must be 
understood in non-representational terms; say in terms of superassertibility.  But then there is a rival, 
non-alethic explanation of why Jeff falls under ‘is cool’ on the cards: we can say that it is because ‘Jeff 
is cool’ is superassertible, rather than because it is true.  Again, the specifically alethic element in 
Edwards’s explanatory story looks explanatorily idle.  The rival proposal lets the property that is, by 
the pluralist’s own lights, co-extensive with truth in the relevant cases play the relevant explanatory 
role; and in doing so does not demand a bifurcation in the nature of truth.  If we explain Jeff’s falling 
under ‘is cool’ in terms of ‘Jeff is cool’ being superassertible, then – as with objective properties – we 
can explain why ‘is cool’ is true of Jeff and hence why ‘Jeff is cool’ is true via the relevant instances of 
(FT) and (TO).  That Fness is projected is thus perfectly compatible with ‘a is F’ being true in a 
representational sense. 
So, even if we grant predicate nominalism about merely abundant properties, and the 
argument from predicate nominalism to projection, and we think that the properties of the relevant 
domain are merely abundant, we do not here have a compelling argument for truth pluralism. 
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2.3 Conclusion to section 2 
 
In this section, we’ve considered three “ontological” reasons for thinking that while what is 
true sometimes depends on what is so, what is so sometimes depends on what is true, and thus that 
truth is sometimes representational and sometimes non-representational: that different entities 
literally exist in different ways; that some entities are objective while others are projected; and that 
some properties are sparse while others are merely abundant.  While not hopeless, the arguments 
are unpersuasive: it is quite possible to give an anti-realist gloss on the relevant entities without having 
to think that their existence depends specifically on the truth of various sentences – indeed, by the 
pluralist’s own lights the latter just seems to introduce an extra, otherwise redundant step into the 
explanation – and without this specifically alethic element in the explanatory story, the argument for 
truth pluralism cannot get off the ground. 
 
3. Truth and Causation 
 
Our attempts to find an ontological motivation for truth pluralism have thus far been 
unsuccessful.  But notice that we have been focusing exclusively on the purported relata of the 
correspondence relation, to the exclusion of the relation itself.  (I’ll use ‘correspondence’ as a label for 
the relation that holds between a truthbearer and “the world” when the former is true in a 
substantive, representational sense.)  This is dialectically significant.  If correspondence ought to be 
understood a certain way, then this may set constraints on what can stand in the relation, thus 
restricting the theory’s potential scope.  This is the line pursued by Lynch (2009).18  In particular, Lynch 
argues from (a) a causal-representational interpretation of correspondence, and (b) the claim that 
causal representationalism does not apply to certain beliefs, to argue that (c) truth for the relevant 
beliefs is non-representational. 
 
18 All citations in this section to Lynch (2009), unless otherwise noted. 
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In this section, we’ll consider this alternative argumentative strategy.  We’ll proceed as 
follows.  In 3.1, we’ll set out Lynch’s argument.  In 3.2, we’ll consider a variety of ontological grounds 
for (b).  Finally, 3.3 evaluates, and articulates three objections to, Lynch’s argument.  Ultimately, we’ll 
see that we run into similar difficulties to those above.  While the causal-representational conception 
of correspondence is effective in setting constraints on its scope, the restriction itself appears 
unmotivated: in particular, the pluralist appears to be committed to the adequacy of a non-causal 
interpretation of correspondence in just those cases where the causal interpretation gives out.  
Moreover, as far as I can see this issue is structural, and will therefore affect any argument for 
pluralism that proceeds along these lines. 
 
3.1 Causal representationalism 
 
Lynch focuses on beliefs composed of concepts, which we’ll denote with angle brackets: 
<furry> is the concept of furriness.19  According to Lynch (22-32), the correspondence theory of truth 
finds its most plausible contemporary guise in causalist interpretations of what have been called 
“building block” theories of representation.  Such a theory will tell you what it is for <Felix> to 
represent Felix, and <furry> to represent furriness.  The representational content of the belief that 
Felix is furry is then a function of these components: it is true iff the object <Felix> represents 
exemplifies the property <furry> represents.  Lynch (25) gives us a toy version of a causalist 
interpretation of such a theory, which I’ve adapted for our example: 
 
CAUSAL: <furry> denotes furriness = instances of furriness cause, under appropriate 
conditions, mental tokenings of <furry>. 
 
 
19 Lynch primarily talks in terms of beliefs, only sometimes propositions.  He also suggests (23) that the 
considerations apply mutatis mutandis to sentences. 
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Causal theories of representation are familiar from the literature.  Just as a photo might 
represent Amy rather than her identical twin Annie, not because of any relevant similarity between 
the photo and Amy that does not hold between the photo and Annie, but because Amy was causally 
involved in the production of the photograph in the right way (Stampe 1977: 43), so too <furry> 
represents furriness because furriness is appropriately involved in the production of thoughts 
involving <furry>.  Such is the broad idea.20  Call this, the causal-representational theory of 
correspondence. 
CAUSAL constrains what can stand in the correspondence relation, so understood: for the 
belief that a is G to correspond to reality requires that the concept <G> is causally responsive to Gs, 
so Gs must be the type of thing with which something can causally interact.  Lynch’s driving thought 
is that CAUSAL, and thus the correspondence conception of truth, is hereby limited in scope: 
 
‘[…] where responsiveness is not plausible – either because the [mental] states in question 
aren’t appropriately causally responsive or because the external environment contains no Gs 
that can be so causally responsive – then it is less likely that mental-states with Gish content 
have that content because they represent Gs.  Some other explanation of their content 
becomes more likely.  And – to anticipate the central lesson – if we nonetheless wish to 
maintain that the relevant mental states are true, some other account of what makes them 
true must be pushed onto the field.’ (33)21 
 
Note that, in the present context, mere scepticism about the existence of some entity (e.g. 
numbers) – that is, the contention that there are no Gs – is not the kind of thing we’re after.22  I’m 
 
20 Lynch (26) also considers a toy teleosemantic theory, but its implications for our purposes are no different 
from CAUSAL. 
21 See also Lynch (2001: 724; 2004: 285).  By ‘the [mental] states in question aren’t appropriately causally 
responsive’ to the external environment, I suspect that Lynch has partly in mind the contention that takes 
centre-stage in Lynch (2013): that thought in some domains in non-representational.  This would form part of a 
functional or teleological, rather than ontological, motivation for pluralism. 
22 Though contrast Lynch (2008: 122). 
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assuming that we do not want to simultaneously hold that ‘7 is prime’ is true and so 7 is prime, and 
that the number 7 does not exist.  What we’re after are reasons for thinking the relevant entities 
‘cannot be so causally responsive’.  If our beliefs in some domain are concerned with entities that 
cannot enter the relevant causal interactions, and yet (some of) our beliefs are true, then – since 
correspondence is causal – we must understand truth in the relevant discourse non-
representationally. 
Lynch thus suggests an argument from (a) a causal-representational interpretation of 
correspondence, and (b) the claim that causal representationalism does not apply to certain beliefs, 
to (c) truth for the relevant beliefs being non-representational.  (The background assumptions 
required to get us to truth pluralism – which we’ll grant – are that truth must at least sometimes be 
understood representationally, and that at least some of our (atomic) beliefs in the (b) discourses are 
true in a substantive sense.) 
So, we’ll first (3.2) consider four ontological grounds for (b): that certain beliefs concern 
entities that are (i) merely abundant; (ii) non-natural; (iii) abstract; or (iv) mind-dependent.  The case 
is more convincing for (i)-(iii) than for (iv).  We’ll then (3.3) ask whether CAUSAL’s limited scope does, 
in fact, give us good reason to go in for truth pluralism. 
 
3.2 Causally impotent entities 
 
3.2.1 Abundant, non-natural, and abstract entities 
 
The case for merely abundant, non-natural, and abstract entities falling outside the scope of 
CAUSAL is straightforward, since in each case it follows almost by definition.  Merely abundant 
properties, recall, we introduced in contrast to “sparse” properties, which ground genuine similarities 
between entities and hence are causal-explanatorily important.  Something’s being a turkey predicts 
and explains various things about what it’s like and how it behaves.  Its being quurkey does not do so, 
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precisely because there is nothing substantive that just the quarks and turkeys have in common.  While 
Lynch doesn’t consider merely abundant properties, if the distinction is in good standing, then they 
are a good example of the type of thing that might fall outside the scope of CAUSAL. 
Lynch (34) seems to raise the point about non-natural entities almost in passing.  When 
discussing moral properties, he says that ‘it is difficult to know how wrongness – even if we grant that 
it is a property – can be a natural property with which we can interact.’  The thought seems to be that 
a moral property must be non-natural, as per moral non-naturalism.23  Very roughly, non-naturalists 
argue that moral properties are not subject to investigation by the natural sciences, and are not 
reducible to such “natural” properties, but are rather autonomous entities of their own kind.  The 
further relevant thought is that they are thus not part of the causal order of things (otherwise they 
would be subject to such investigation). 
On the face of it, this is a surprising place to look for motivation for truth pluralism, since it 
would be odd to combine moral non-naturalism with a non-representational theory of moral truth.  
On the one hand, non-naturalists are traditionally the arch moral realists, so it would be surprising to 
see them reject a correspondence conception of moral truth.  On the other, one might have hoped 
that going non-representational about moral truth would enable us to do without postulating such 
exotic entities.  Still, that a partnership is surprising does not render it unworthy of consideration. 
Finally, as Lynch (34) notes, abstract entities, in contrast to concrete entities, are standardly 
taken to lack spatiotemporal location and hence to be causally inefficacious.  Paradigm abstract 
entities, like numbers, hereby straightforwardly fall outside the scope of CAUSAL. 
One might take issue with any of the foregoing, arguing that gerrymandered, non-natural, or 
abstract entities are causally efficacious (and this would, in the end, be grist to my mill).  However, it’s 
plausible enough that such entities fall outside the scope of CAUSAL that we’ll grant it for the sake of 
argument, to see what follows vis-à-vis pluralism. 
 
23 ‘Natural’ is used in many ways in the literature, so perhaps this is not what Lynch had in mind.  But the 
suggestion is pertinent nonetheless. 
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3.2.2 Mind-dependence 
 
Another distinction that Lynch – and, indeed, many other pluralists – brings up in this context 
is that between mind-independent and mind-dependent entities.  According to Lynch (33), naturalistic 
theories of representation like CAUSAL, and even its non-naturalistic predecessors, are committed to: 
 
‘[t]rue beliefs map[ping] objects that exist and have their properties mind-independently. […]  
An object exists (or has some property) mind-independently at some time just when it would 
continue to exist (or have that property) even if there were no minds that represented it as 
having that property.’ 
 
He thus argues that, for instance, “legal propositions” fall outside the scope of CAUSAL.  But 
why think that CAUSAL is committed to the mind-independence of the “worldly” relatum?  In its 
defence, Lynch (33) only says that it is ‘a consequence of the fact that representational views intend 
their position to be realist.’  So construed, however, it is an additional bolt-on, and not a consequence, 
of the view.  (Besides, I’m sceptical that mind-independence is necessary for “realism”, in any non-
stipulative sense – see e.g. Barnes (2017).) 
Why think that mind-dependence frustrates CAUSAL?  One thought might be that mind-
independence is necessary for causal efficacy.  But it would be, at best, surprising to find out that all 
mind-dependent properties and facts are causally redundant.  Is Prince William’s inheritance of 
Catherine Middleton’s estate in the event of her death not caused by his being married to her?  Is 
someone’s being fined for speeding not caused by the fact that it is illegal?  Many think that race and 
gender are mind-dependent (perhaps because “socially constructed”); but presumably still want to 
say that someone’s race or gender might cause them to be subject to various kinds of structural 
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privilege or oppression.  (One might respond that these are not instances of causation, but of non-
causal explanation.  But to do this merely on the basis of mind-dependence seems ad hoc.)24 
One may concede that mind-dependent entities enter into causal relations while thinking that 
there is a difference in the kind of causal role we attribute to them.  Take, for instance, Wright’s (1992: 
196) notion of “width of cosmological role”.  A state of affairs has a “wide” or “broad” cosmological 
role only if it is ‘potentially contributive to the explanation of things other than, or other than via, our 
being in attitudinal states which take such states of affairs as object.’  One might suspect that mind-
dependent states of affairs have only narrow cosmological role.  For instance, that Prince William 
inherits Catherine Middleton’s estate seems to be explained by the fact that the right people believe 
he is married to her.  If all the explanatory work of such states of affairs, and hence the causal work, 
goes “via” our mental states about them, then it has only a “narrow” cosmological role.  By contrast, 
that iron behaves the way it does around magnets is explained in terms of its being magnetic, without 
any intermediary reference to our mental states; so iron’s being magnetic has “wide” cosmological 
role.25  However, even if mind-dependent states of affairs ipso facto have narrow cosmological roles, 
this does not automatically have any bearing on CAUSAL, since it is explicitly built into the definition 
of a narrow cosmological role that such states of affairs can (directly, as it were) explain ‘our being in 
attitudinal states which take such states of affairs as object’.26  If this explanation is not to be construed 
as a causal explanation in the case of mind-dependent states of affairs, we need to be told why not. 
 
24 For this reason among others, it is perplexing that mind-dependence is so often alluded to as an obvious 
motivating factor for truth pluralism, e.g. Cotnoir & Edwards (2015: 118); Edwards (2011: 29); Lynch (2001: 
724; 2004: 385); Pedersen (2006: 102; 2010: 93); Wright & Pedersen (2010: 210).  Note that I am not here 
suggesting that all, say, moral, institutional, or mathematical explanations are causal explanations.  All I’m 
objecting to is the idea that we can infer that certain explanations are non-causal on the grounds that the 
relevant entities are mind-dependent. 
25 Width of cosmological role plays a prominent role in Edwards’s overall theory: he (2018: 70) suggests that 
narrow cosmological role is a sign that a property is merely abundant (and thus projected; meaning truth in 
the relevant discourse is non-representational).  Even if this is right, it would not affect the earlier arguments. 
26 One could maintain that some states of affairs have only super-narrow cosmological role, which rules this 
out.  Then, it seems, CAUSAL becomes straightforwardly circular.  (This is one way of reading Lynch’s (161-162) 
argument concerning moral properties.)  This is risky.  One might reasonably think that error theory or 
fictionalism is more appropriate for such states of affairs: being a witch has a super-narrow cosmological role 
because there are no witches. 
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In that spirit, let me offer a tentative reconstruction of why one might take mind-dependence 
to be incompatible with CAUSAL.  As with the arguments considered in section 2, the principal issue 
concerns explanatory circularity.  Suppose that instances of marriage are grounded in our mental 
states; in particular, that whether or not someone is married depends on whether or not (certain 
relevant) people believe that they are married.  (Note that this is a stronger condition than Lynch’s 
mind-dependence, since it appeals to particular mental states.)  Now, such beliefs are partially 
individuated by the fact that they are about marriage: that <marriage> represents marriage.  If we in 
turn appeal to CAUSAL to explain this representational fact, we appeal to instances of marriage to 
explain why this belief is about marriage.  But instances of marriage are meant to be grounded in 
beliefs about marriage; and these beliefs about marriage will need to be explained in terms of 
instances of marriage…  And so on, around and around.  So – the reasoning goes – one cannot use 
CAUSAL to explain the content of concepts concerning mind-dependent properties, on pain of 
circularity. 
As I say, I offer this reconstruction only tentatively; I am unconvinced myself.  (I’m not 
convinced that this need be viciously circular rather than a benign regress, for example.)  However, 
let’s grant it for the sake of argument, since I think using mind-dependence as a basis for truth 
pluralism makes Lynch’s position much more interesting.  (One would be hard-pressed to deny that 
anything is mind-dependent, after all.) 
 
3.3 Criticism 
 
To recap: Lynch argues from (a) a causal-representational theory of correspondence, and (b) 
that causal representationalism does not apply to certain beliefs, to (c) that truth for the relevant 
beliefs is non-representational.  We’ve considered four ontological grounds for (b): that the entities 
the relevant discourses are concerned with are merely abundant, non-natural, abstract, or mind-
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dependent.  In this section, I’ll raise three objections to Lynch’s argument: the first concerning (b), the 
second concerning (a), and the third concerning the inference from (a) and (b) to (c). 
First, regarding (b), Lynch’s argumentative strategy presents a couple of problems.  He makes 
the case for (b) by discussing CAUSAL; but CAUSAL is explicitly a toy theory, to be replaced by 
something more sophisticated.  It’s thus a live question to what extent the critique of CAUSAL will be 
a reliable guide to the scope of its sophisticated successor.  Stewart Shapiro (2009) makes this point 
with regards to <nitrogen> and <gravitational field>: 
 
‘To belabor the obvious, nitrogen does not “cause, under appropriate circumstances, mental 
tokenings of” [<nitrogen>].  […] For one thing, we are (almost) always in the presence of 
nitrogen.  Similarly, mental states with gravitational-field-ish content are not causally 
responsive to an external environment that contains gravitational fields.  Every external 
environment contains a gravitational field.’27 
 
One option, of course, is to incorporate discourses that use such “theoretical” concepts into 
(b), and thus place them outside the scope of correspondence.  I take it this would make the resultant 
pluralism less attractive to many.  But Shapiro’s point is a dialectical one: that the sophisticated theory 
may well capture such concepts, rendering CAUSAL an unreliable guide.  As he puts it: ‘There may 
nevertheless be a scope problem for the envisioned correspondence based property […] but we’ll have 
to wait for details to find out what it is.’ 
More importantly, once reference has been secured for some concepts, there is a natural 
extension of the program to secure reference to further entities.  Consider <quurkey> again.  Suppose 
that <quark> and <turkey> refer to quarks and turkeys, respectively, by virtue of standing in the right 
causal relation to quarks and turkeys.  Then we can define the concept of quurkeyness as before: x is 
 
27 See also Smith (2010) and Connolly (2012). 
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quurkey iff (x is a quark or x is a turkey).28  In this way, the causal account can provide a kind of “source 
intentionality”, of which the intentionality of other concepts can be derivative.  Indeed, the structure 
of this strategy is enshrined in Lewis’s (1970) proposal for “How to Define Theoretical Terms” (though 
Lewis is not committed to a causal derivation of source intentionality).  Very roughly, given a scientific 
theory – about, say, nitrogen – one can “Ramsify” out the theoretical term: replace every occurrence 
with a variable, x, bound by an existential quantifier.  Your “Ramsified” theory says that there is an 
entity, x, that has all the features that the theory takes nitrogen to have.  Provided that the other 
terms that occur are already meaningful (in our case, through having their reference explained 
causally), <nitrogen> refers to the entity, supposing there is one, that satisfies the description (or the 
best deserver).  The point is: granting causal representationalism for certain concepts, provided that 
your source intentionality is rich enough, one can secure reference to further entities despite the 
absence of the relevant causal relation.  If such a strategy cannot be extended to accommodate moral, 
mathematical, institutional, etc. discourse, we need to be told why. 
So, while it's plausible that reference to merely abundant, non-natural, and abstract entities 
cannot be secured through direct causal means, it is much more contentious that such entities remain 
beyond the reach of a causal theory that is supplemented in this way.  Merely abundant properties 
like quurkeyness are straightforwardly accounted for; and moral functionalists already argue that 
reference to moral properties is best understood in something like this way.29 
Second, note that Lynch himself doesn’t provide much by way of argument for (a).  He states 
that contemporary versions of the correspondence theory are ‘widely accepted in philosophy and 
implicitly accepted by many cognitive scientists and psychologists’ (22); and then makes a case that 
causal representationalism is such a contemporary version.30  Now, the tenor of the discussion 
 
28 This requires that the logical concepts involved in the definition are also meaningful.  This is important, but 
creates complications we need not get hung up on here. 
29 E.g. Jackson (1998).  While functionalism is typically employed by naturalists, the strategy itself is compatible 
with non-naturalism. 
30 I am willing to grant this for the purposes of this paper.  But one might think of CAUSAL as a theory of 
meaning or content, rather than truth.  For instance, one might argue that CAUSAL is a theory about how a 
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suggests that Lynch sees causal representationalism as indispensable to ‘the over-arching research 
program of cognitive science [which] takes it that the mind – that is, the brain – is an organ part of 
whose function is to represent the world around it’ (22).  But this would be a contentious claim indeed 
– that the brain represents the world around it is one issue; how it does so is quite another, which 
might admit of non-causal explanation.31  CAUSAL, or its sophisticated successor, may well be plausible 
for certain concepts; but we ought to be open to a non-causal theory of representation, at least for 
certain other concepts, should one be forthcoming. 
Which brings us neatly to the final, principal difficulty facing Lynch’s argumentative strategy.  
Lynch suggests that, where representation cannot be explained in causal terms, some non-
representational theory of truth must be appealed to.  But the most this could show is that 
representation cannot always be cashed out in causal terms.  It’s compatible with this that it should 
be explained in non-causal terms for abundant, non-natural, abstract, or mind-dependent entities; 
and thus that truth should always be a matter of accurate representation.  That is, we might appeal 
to a pluralistic theory of reference determination, rather than truth.32 
Lynch (162-163) is sensitive to something like this worry, but points out that coming up with 
such a theory “seems difficult”.  But now we come full circle.  By Lynch’s own lights, truth in the 
relevant domain consists in some non-representational property, like superassertibility.33  Therefore, 
by his own lights an extensionally adequate theory of reference determination is one that appeals to 
the relevant truthbearers being superassertible (rather than true).  For instance, suppose that the 
moral belief that x is wrong is true iff it is superassertible.34  If this is right, we have at our disposal a 
 
proposition comes to be the content of a particular mental state (or expressed by a particular sentence); while 
a theory of truth should tell us what it is for that proposition to be true. 
31 Inferentialist and interpretationist competitors spring to mind.  JRG Williams (2020) argues that the latter 
can concede that, and even explain why, causalists and inferentialists latch onto informative generalisations in 
certain cases, thereby explaining the local attraction of the view that Lynch (e.g. 2009: 33) leans on. 
32 As Lynch (34, fn.16) seems to concede.  This is Shapiro’s suggested modification; see also Sher (1998).  We 
might think of the extension just discussed as introducing such a bifurcation: reference determination for 
source intentionality is causal; otherwise it’s descriptive. 
33 For Lynch (171-177), it is a property he calls concordance. 
34 Superassertibility applies more naturally to sentences than beliefs; but the point I’m making is structural. 
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substantive, non-causal theory of reference determination for ethical concepts: x is in the extension 
of <wrong> iff <x> refers to x and the belief that x is wrong is superassertible.  But now, having 
explained reference in terms of superassertibility, the truth of the belief can be explained “building-
block”-style, in the manner Lynch prefers.  Coming up with a pluralistic theory of reference 
determination is thus no more (or less!) difficult than coming up with a pluralistic theory of truth.  And 
if CAUSAL and its ilk count as explications of correspondence, so does this.  Once again, theoretical 
economy endorses the theory that does not bifurcate the nature of truth as well as reference. 
Finally, it’s worth noting that, as far as I can see, nothing in the structure of this dialectic hinges 
on the fact that Lynch is appealing to a causal theory of correspondence.  I thus suspect this kind of 
challenge could be pressed against any argument for pluralism that goes via arguing, on ontological 
grounds, that your preferred representational conception of truth has limited scope. 
Lynch’s attempt to motivate pluralism via a causal-representationalist theory of 
correspondence is therefore uncompelling.  On the one hand, a sophisticated causal 
representationalism can in general explain reference to entities with which we do not causally interact 
in the correct way, meaning the scope of the theory is still an open question.  On the other, the causal 
constraint on representation is itself unmotivated; and, indeed, pluralists themselves look to be 
committed to the extensional adequacy of a non-causal theory in just those cases in which the causal 
account fails. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Drawing on material provided by pluralists themselves, we’ve surveyed a variety of potential 
ontological grounds for truth pluralism: that certain entities (i) literally exist in a different way; (ii) are 
projected; (iii) are merely abundant; (iv) are non-natural; (v) are abstract; or (vi) are mind-dependent.  
In such cases, the Edwards-style strategy is to argue that what is so depends on what is true; so truth 
must be non-representational.  The Lynch-style strategy is to argue that truth is non-causal, and hence 
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non-representational.  While not hopeless, we’ve seen that neither strategy is especially compelling.  
The additional premises needed to move from such ontological distinctions to truth pluralism are 
unattractive, often only serving to bifurcate the nature of truth when more conservative options are 
available.  This makes me pessimistic about the prospects for building truth pluralism on ontological 
foundations. 
But even if that is right, all is not lost.  The metaphysical strategies we’ve been considering 
start from the idea that there is an important dimension of ontological variation between the entities 
that different discourses are concerned with, and try to argue for truth pluralism on this basis.  The 
inevitable question is: why not just appeal to variation in the kinds of entities that sit on one end of 
the correspondence relation, rather than bifurcating the nature of truth? 
Contrast this starting point, however, with metaethical expressivism.  Expressivists 
characteristically deny that we get an informative explanation of what’s going on in the moral domain 
by postulating a realm of moral facts or properties that we use moral talk to describe.  Instead, we 
should postulate a set of pro- and con-attitudes – attitudes of approval and disapproval, say – that we 
use moral talk to express.  Such states have a “desire-like” functional role, rather than a “belief-like” 
one: functioning to push us into action, rather than to represent the world around us.  The crucial 
disanalogy is that the expressivist does not postulate entities of a peculiar ontological kind to explain 
moral discourse.  Rather, she does not postulate entities for this explanatory purpose at all.  The 
expressivist does not appeal to an ontological distinction, but a functional one: moral thought and talk 
serves a non-representational function.  At the outset, then, there is no question of moral truth 
consisting in accurate representation of the moral facts; for there are no facts to sit on the “worldly” 
end of the correspondence relation.35  The version of “double-counting” worry we’ve been considering 
thus cannot get a grip. 
 
35 However, see Ridge (2014) for an ambitious attempt to “earn the right” to a correspondence conception of 
moral truth on expressivist grounds. 
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Alas, expressivists have not tended to be truth pluralists.  Early expressivists denied that moral 
discourse is truth-apt;36 contemporary expressivists, especially “quasi-realists”, typically go in for 
deflationism.37  But while I cannot argue it here, I suspect that there are good reasons for expressivists 
to be dissatisfied with a deflationary conception of moral truth.38  Truth pluralists would be well-
served if so.  The third way between deflationism and correspondence is to appeal to a substantive, 
but non-representational, conception of moral truth.  If we must nonetheless go in for a 
representational conception of truth elsewhere – such as in discourses that do serve a 
representational function – then the result is truth pluralism; one grounded in an underlying functional 
or teleological diversity, rather than an ontological one. 
Moreover, I’d be surprised to find that those sympathetic with a non-representational 
conception of truth in a particular discourse were not also attracted to a non-representational 
explanation of the discourse’s function.  Indeed, this seems a more natural home for truth pluralism 
than one which sees such discourses as uniformly representational in function, but concerned with 
different kinds of entity.  Of course, it remains to be seen if such a strategy is viable, or if it runs into 
“double-counting” worries of its own.  But given what I’ve argued here, pluralists ought to be 
interested in finding out. 
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